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Capitalism is characterized by booms and busts. Periods of strong growth in output alternate 
with periods of declines in economic growth. Every macro-economic theory should attempt to 
explain these endemic business cycle movements. In this paper I present two paradigms that 
attempt to explain these booms and busts. One is the DSGE-paradigm in which agents have 
unlimited cognitive abilities. The other paradigm is a behavioural one in which agents are 
assumed to have limited cognitive abilities. These two types of models produce a radically 
different macroeconomic dynamics. I analyze these differences. I also study the different 
policy implications of these two paradigms. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Capitalism is characterized by booms and busts; by periods of strong growth in output 
followed by periods of declines in economic growth. Every macro-economic theory 
should attempt at explaining these endemic business cycle movements. How does the 
New Keynesian (DSGE) model explain booms and busts in economic activity? And 
how does an alternative, behavioural, model explain these features? These are the 
questions analyzed in this paper.  
In order to answer this question it is useful to present some stylized facts about the 
cyclical movements of output. In Figure 1 we show the movements of the output gap 
in  the  US  since  1960.  We  observe  strong  cyclical  movements.  These  cyclical 
movements imply that there is strong autocorrelation  in the output gap numbers, i.e. 
the output gap in period t is strongly correlated with the output gap in period t-1. The 
intuition is that if there are cyclical movements we will observe clustering of good 
and bad times. A positive (negative) output gap is likely to be followed by a positive 
(negative) output gap in the next period. This is what we find for the US output gap 
over  the  period  1960-2009:  the  autocorrelation  coefficient  is  0.94.  Similar 
autocorrelation coefficients are found in other countries.  
A second stylized fact about the movements in the output gap is that these are not 
normally distributed. We show the evidence for the US in Figure 2. We find, first, that 
there  is  excess  kurtosis  (kurtosis=  3.62),  which  means  that  there  is  too  much 
concentration  of  observations  around  the  mean  to  be  consistent  with  a  normal 
distribution.  Second,  we  find  that  there  are  fat  tails,  i.e.  there  are  more  large 
movements in the output gap than is compatible with the normal distribution. This 
also means that if we were basing our forecasts on the normal distribution we would 
underestimate the probability that in any one period a large increase or decrease in the 
output  gap  can  occur.  Finally,  the  Jarque-Bera  test  leads  to  a  formal  rejection  of 
normality of the movements in the US output gap series.  
   
 
 




Source: US Department of Commerce and Congressional Budget Office 
Figure 2: Frequency distribution of US Output gap (1960-2009) 
 
Source: US Department of Commerce and Congressional Budget Office 
kurtosis: 3.61; Jarque-Bera: 7.17  with p-value=0.027    
 
In this paper I will contrast the rational expectations (DSGE) model with a behavioral 
macroeconomic model, i.e. a model in which agents have cognitive limitations and do   4 
not understand the whole picture (the underlying model). I will ask the question of 
how these two models explain these empirical regularities.   
The rational expectations model will be the New Keynesian model. Its characteristic 
feature is price and wage inertia. It is sufficiently well known as not requiring much 
explanation. The behavioral modeI is less well known, and I will spend more time to 
develop it. Its basic assumption is that agents have cognitive limitations, i.e. they only 
understand small bits and pieces of the whole model and use simple rules to guide 
their behavior. I will introduce rationality in the model through a selection mechanism 
in which agents evaluate the performance of the rule they are following and decide to 
switch or to stick to the rule depending on how well the rule performs relative to other 
rules.    
The modeling approach presented in this paper is not the only possible one to model 
agents’ behaviour under imperfect information. In fact, a large literature has emerged 
attempting  to  introduce  imperfect  information  into  macroeconomic  models.  These 
attempts have been based mainly on the statistical learning approach pioneered by 
Sargent(1993) and Evans and Honkapohja(2001). This literature leads to important 
new  insights  (see  e.g.  Gaspar  and  Smets(2006),  Orphanides  and  Williams(2004), 
Milani(2007a),  Branch  and  Evans(2009)).  However,  I  feel  that  this  approach  still 
loads  individual  agents  with  too  many  cognitive  skills  that  they  probably  do  not 
posses in the real world
1.   
The purpose of this paper is to contrast the dynamics of the DSGE -model with the 
behavioral model, and to draw some policy conclusions. The paper is very much 
inspired  by  the  new  literature  on  “agent-based  macroeconomic  models”  (see 
Howitt(2008),  Tesfatsion(2006),    LeBaron  and  Tesfatsion(2008)  among  others). 
Section  2  presents  the  behavioural  model”.  The  next  sections  then  discuss  the 
different implications the behavioural model has when contrasted with the rational 
expectations  model.  Section  7  presents  some  empirical  evidence.  The  paper  is 
concluded with a discussion of some methodological issues.  
   
 
                                                 
1 See the fascinating book of Gigerenzer and Todd(1999) on the use of simple heuristics as compared 
to statistical (regression) learning.    5 
 2. A behavioural macroeconomic model 
 
In  this  section  the  modeling  strategy  is  described.  This  is  done  by  presenting  a 
standard aggregate-demand-aggregate supply model augmented with a Taylor rule. 
The novel feature of the model is that agents use simple rules, heuristics, to forecast 
the future. These rules are subjected to an adaptive learning mechanism, i.e., agents 
endogenously select the forecasting rules that have delivered the highest performance 
(“fitness”)  in the past. This selection mechanism acts as a disciplining device on the 
kind of rules that are acceptable. Since agents use different heuristics one obtains 
heterogeneity. This, as will be shown, creates endogenous business cycles.  
This behavioural model is contrasted with a similar model that incorporates rational 
expectations,  and  that  is  interpreted  as  a  stylized  version  of  DSGE-models.  This 
comparison  will  make  it  possible  to  focus  on  some  crucial  differences  in  the 
transmission of shocks, in particular of monetary policy shocks. 
 
2.1 The model 
 
The model consists of an aggregate demand equation, an aggregate supply equation 
and a Taylor rule.  
The aggregate demand equation is specified in the standard way, i.e.  
 
t t t t t t t t E r a y a y E a y            )
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where yt is the output gap in period t, rt is the nominal interest rate, t is the rate of 
inflation, and t is a white noise disturbance term.   t E
~
 is the expectations operator 
where the tilde above E refers to expectations that are not formed rationally. This 
process will be specified subsequently.  I follow the procedure introduced in DSGE-
models of adding a lagged output in the demand equation. This is usually justified by 
invoking  habit  formation.  I  keep  this  assumption  here  as  I  want  to  compare  the 
behavioural  model  with  the  DSGE-rational  expectations  model.    However,  I  will 
show in section 4 that I do not really need this inertia-building device to generate 
inertia in the endogenous variables.     6 
The aggregate supply equation can be derived from profit maximization of individual 
producers. As in DSGE-models a Calvo pricing rule and some indexation rule used in 
adjusting prices is assumed. This leads to a lagged inflation variable in the equation
2. 
The supply curve can also be interpreted as a New Keynesian Philips curve:    
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Finally the Taylor rule describes the behaviour of the central bank 
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where 
*   is the inflation target which for the sake of convenience will be set equal to 
0. Note that, as is commonly done, the central bank is assumed to smooth the interest 
rate. This smoothing behaviour is represented by the lagged interest rate in equation 
(3). Ideally, the Taylor rule should be formulated using a forward looking inflation 
variable, i.e. central banks set the interest rate on the basis of their forecasts about the 
rate of inflation. This was not done here in order to maintain simplicity in the model.   
 
Introducing heuristics in forecasting output 
Agents are assumed to use simple rules (heuristics) to forecast the future output and 
inflation. The way  I proceed is  as  follows.  I start  with  a very simple forecasting 
heuristics and apply it to the forecasting rules of future output. I assume two types of 
forecasting rules. A first rule can be called a “fundamentalist” one. Agents estimate 
the steady state value of the output gap (which is normalized at 0) and use this to 
forecast the future output gap. (In a later extension, it will be assumed that agents do 
not know the steady state output gap with certainty and only have biased estimates of 
it). A second forecasting rule is an “extrapolative” one. This is a rule that does not 
presuppose that agents know the steady state output gap. They are agnostic about it. 
Instead, they extrapolate the previous observed output gap into the future.  
The two rules are specified as follows 
The fundamentalist rule is defined by   0
~
1   t
f
t y E         (4) 
                                                 
2 It is now standard in DSGE-models to use a pricing equation in which marginal costs enter on the 
right hand side. Such an equation is derived from profit maximisation in a world of imperfect 
competition. It can be shown that under certain conditions the aggregate supply equation (3) is 
equivalent to such a pricing equation (see Gali(2008), Smets and Wouters(2003)).    7 
 
The extrapolative rule is defined by  1 1
~
   t t
e
t y y E         (5) 
This kind of simple heuristic has often been used in the behavioural finance literature 
where agents are assumed to use fundamentalist and chartist rules (see Brock and 
Hommes(1997),  Branch  and  Evans(2006),  De  Grauwe  and  Grimaldi(2006)).  It  is 
probably the simplest possible assumption one can make about how agents, which 
experience cognitive limitations, use rules that embody limited knowledge to guide 
their behavior. In this sense they are bottom-up rules. They only require agents to use 
information they understand, and do not require them to understand the whole picture.  
Thus the specification of the heuristics in (4) and (5) should not be interpreted as a 
realistic  representation  of  how  agents  forecast.  Rather  is  it  a  parsimonious 
representation of a world where agents do not know the “Truth” (i.e. the underlying 
model). The use of simple rules does not mean that the agents are dumb and that they 
do not want to learn from their errors. I will specify a learning mechanism later in this 
section in which these agents continuously try to correct for their errors by switching 
from one rule to the other.  
The market forecast is obtained as a weighted average of these two forecasts, i.e.  
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and   1 , ,   t e t f           (8) 
 
where    t f ,    and    t e,    are  the  probabilities  that  agents  use  a  fundamentalist, 
respectively, an extrapolative rule.    
A methodological issue arises here. The forecasting rules (heuristics) introduced here 
are not derived at the micro level and then aggregated. Instead, they are imposed ex 
post, on the demand and supply equations. This has also been the approach in the 
learning  literature  pioneered  by  Evans  and  Honkapohja(2001).  One  could  argue, 
therefore, that my modeling technique is still not fully bottom-up.  Ideally one would 
like to derive the heuristics from the micro-level in an environment in which agents 
experience cognitive problems. Our knowledge about how to model this behaviour at 
the micro level and how to aggregate it is too sketchy, however, and I have not tried   8 
to do so
3.  Clearly, this is an area that will have to be researched in the future.  
As indicated earlier, agents are rational in the sense that they continuously evaluate 
their forecast performance. I apply notions of discrete choice theory (see  Anderson,  
de Palma, and   Thisse, ( 1992) and  Brock  &  Hommes(1997)) in specifying the 
procedure agents follow in this evaluation process . Discrete choice theory  analyzes 
how agents decide between different altern atives. The theory  takes the view tha t 
agents are boundedly rational, i.e. utility has a deterministic component and a random 
component. Agents compute the forecast performance of the different heuristics as 
follows: 
    (9)   
        (10) 
 
where Uf,t and Ue,t  are the forecast performances (utilities) of the fundamentalists and 
extrapolators, respectively. These are defined as the mean squared forecasting errors 
(MSFEs) of the optimistic and pessimistic forecasting rules;  k  are geometrically 
declining weights.  
Applying  discrete  choice  theory  the  probability  that  an  agent  will  use  the 
fundamentalist forecasting rule is given by the expression  (Anderson,  de Palma, and  
Thisse, (1992) and Brock-Hommes(1997)):  
 





t e t f
t f






       (11) 
Similarly the probability that an agent will use the extrapolative forecasting rule is 
given by:  
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     (12) 
Equation  (11)  says  that  as  the  past  forecast  performance  of  the  fundamentalists 
improves  relative  to  that  of  the  extrapolators  agents  are  more  likely  to  select  the 
fundamentalist rule about the output gap for their future forecasts. As a result the 
probability  that  agents  use  the  fundamentalist  rule  increases.  Equation  (12)  has  a 
                                                 
3 Psychologists and brains scientists struggle to understand how our brain processes information. There 
is as yet no generally accepted model we could use to model the micro-foundations of information 
processing. There are some attempts to provide micro-foundations of models with agents experiencing 
cognitive limitations, though. See e.g. Kirman, (1992), Delli Gatti, et al.(2005).  
 
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similar  interpretation.  The  parameter  γ  measures  the  “intensity  of  choice”.  It 
parametrizes the extent to which the deterministic component of utility determines 
actual choice. When γ = 0  utility is purely stochastic. In that case agents decide to be 
fundamentalist  or  extrapolator  by  tossing  a  coin  and  the  probability  to  be 
fundamentalist  (or  extrapolator)  is  exactly  0.5.  When  γ  =  ∞  utility  is  fully 
deterministic and the probability of using a fundamentalist rule is either 1 or 0. The 
parameter γ can also be interpreted as expressing a willingness to learn from past 
performance. When γ = 0 this willingness is zero; it increases with the size of γ. 
Note that this selection mechanism is the disciplining device introduced in this model 
on the kind of rules of behaviour that are acceptable. Only those rules that pass the 
fitness  test  remain  in  place.  The  others  are  weeded  out.  In  contrast  with  the 
disciplining device implicit in rational expectations models which implies that agents 
have superior cognitive capacities, we do not have to make such an assumption here.  
It should also be stressed that although individuals use simple rules in forecasting the 
future, this does not mean that they fail to learn. In fact the fitness criterion used 
should  be  interpreted  as  a  learning  mechanism  based  on  “trial  and  error”.  When 
observing that the rule they use performs less well than the alternative rule, agents are 
willing to switch to the more performing rule. Put differently, agents avoid making 
systematic mistakes by constantly being willing to learn from past mistakes and to 
change their behavior. This also ensures that the market forecasts are unbiased.  
The  mechanism  driving  the  selection  of  the  rules  introduces  a  self-organizing 
dynamics  in  the  model.  It  is  a  dynamics  that  is  beyond  the  capacity  of  any  one 
individual  in  the  model  to  understand.  In  this  sense  it  is  a  bottom-up  system.  It 
contrasts with the mainstream macroeconomic models in which it is assumed that 
some or all agents can take a bird’s eye view and understand the whole picture. These 
agents not only understand the whole picture but also use this whole picture to decide 
about their optimal behaviour. Thus there is a one-to-one correspondence between the 
total information embedded in the world and the individual brains.  
 
Introducing heuristics in forecasting inflation 
Agents also have to forecast inflation. A similar simple heuristics is used as in the 
case of output gap forecasting, with one rule that could be called a fundamentalist rule   10 
and the other an extrapolative rule. (See Brazier et al. (2006) for a similar setup). The 
fundamentalist rule is based on the announced inflation target, i.e. agents using this 
rule have confidence in the credibility of this rule and use it to forecast inflation. The 
extrapolative rule is used by agents who do not trust the announced inflation target. 
Instead they extrapolate inflation from the past into the future.  
The fundamentalist rule will be called an “inflation targeting” rule. It consists in using 
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where the inflation target 
*   is normalized to be equal to 0 
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The market forecast is a weighted average of these two forecasts, i.e.  
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The  same  selection  mechanism  is  used  as  in  the  case  of  output  forecasting  to 
determine the probabilities of agents trusting the inflation target and those who do not 
trust it and revert to extrapolation of past inflation, i.e.  
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where Utar,t and Uext,t are the weighted averages of past squared forecast errors of 
using targeter and extrapolator rules, respectively. These are defined in the same way 
as in (9) and (10). 
This inflation forecasting heuristics can be interpreted as a procedure of agents to find 
out how credible the central bank’s inflation targeting is. If this is very credible, using 
the  announced  inflation  target  will  produce  good  forecasts  and  as  a  result,  the   11 
probability that agents will rely on the inflation target will be high. If on the other 
hand  the  inflation  target  does  not  produce  good  forecasts  (compared  to  a  simple 
extrapolation rule) the probability that agents will use it will be small.  
The solution of the model is found by first substituting (3) into (1) and rewriting in 
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The  solution  exists  if  the  matrix  A is  non-singular, i.e. if (1-a2c2)a2b2c1 ≠  0.  The 
system (21) describes the solution for yt and t given the forecasts of yt and t . The 
latter have been specified in equations (4) to (12) and can be substituted into (21). 
Finally, the solution for rt  is found by substituting yt and t obtained from (21) into 
(3).  
My research strategy consists in comparing the dynamics of this behavioural model 
with  the same structural model (aggregate demand equation (1), aggregate supply 
equation  (2)  and  Taylor  rule  equation  (3))  under  rational  expectations  which  I 
interpret as a stylized DSGE-model.   
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   12 
This model can be solved under rational expectations using the Binder-Pesaran(1996) 
procedure.  
 
2.2 Calibrating the model  
I  proceed  by  calibrating  the  model.  In  appendix  A    the  parameters  used  in  the 
calibration exercise are presented. The model was calibrated in such a way that the 
time units can be considered to be months. A sensitivity analysis of the main results to 
changes in the some of the parameters of the model will be presented. The three 
shocks  (demand  shocks,  supply  shocks  and  interest  rate  shocks)  are  i.i.d.  with 
standard deviations of 0.5%. 
 
3. Animal spirits, learning and forgetfulness 
In this section simulations of the behavioural model in the time domain are presented 
and interpreted. The upper panel of Figure 3 shows the time pattern of the output gap 
produced by the behavioural model. A strong cyclical movement in the output gap can 
be observed. The lower panel of Figure 3 shows a variable called “animal spirits”
4. It 
represents  the  evolution  of  the  fractions  of  the  agents  who  extrapolate  a  positive 
output gap. Thus when the curve reaches +1 all agents are extrapolating a positive 
output gap; when the curve reaches 0 no agents are extrapolating a positive output 
gap. In fact in that case they all extrapolate a negative output gap. Thus the curve 
shows the degree of optimism and pessimism of agents who make forecasts of the 
output gap.  
Combining the information of the two panels in figure 3 it can be seen that the model 
generates  endogenous  waves  of  optimism  and  pessimism.  During  some  periods 
optimists  (i.e.  agents  who  extrapolate  positive  output  gaps)  dominate  and  this 
translates into above average output growth. These optimistic periods are followed by 
pessimistic ones when pessimists (i.e. agents who extrapolate negative output gaps) 
dominate and the growth rate of output is below average. These waves of optimism 
and pessimism are essentially unpredictable. Other realizations of the shocks produce 
different cycles with the same general characteristics.  
                                                 
4 See Mario Nuti (2009)on the different interpretations of “Animal Spirits”. The locus classicus is 
Keynes(1936). See also Farmer(2006) and the recent book of Akerlof and Shiller(2009).   13 




These endogenously generated cycles in output are made possible by a self-fulfilling 
mechanism that can be described as follows. A series of random shocks creates the 
possibility that one of the two forecasting rules, say the extrapolating one, delivers a 
higher payoff, i.e. a lower mean squared forecast error (MSFE). This attracts agents 
that were using the fundamentalist rule. If the successful extrapolation happens to be a 
positive extrapolation, more agents will start extrapolating the positive output gap. 
The “contagion-effect” leads to an increasing use of the optimistic extrapolation of the 
output-gap, which in turn stimulates aggregate demand. Optimism is therefore self-
fulfilling. A boom is created. At some point, negative stochastic shocks and/or the 
reaction of the central bank through the Taylor rule make a dent in the MSFE of the 
optimistic forecasts. Fundamentalist forecasts may become attractive again, but it is 
equally  possible  that  pessimistic  extrapolation  becomes  attractive  and  therefore 
fashionable again. The economy turns around.   
 
   14 
These waves of optimism and pessimism can be understood to be searching (learning) 
mechanisms  of agents  who do not  fully  understand the underlying model  but  are 
continuously  searching  for  the  truth.  An  essential  characteristic  of  this  searching 
mechanism  is  that  it  leads  to  systematic  correlation  in  beliefs  (e.g.  optimistic 
extrapolations or pessimistic extrapolations). This systematic correlation is at the core 
of the booms and busts created in the model. Note, however, that when computed 
over a significantly large period of time the average error in the forecasting goes to 
zero. In this sense, the forecast bias tends to disappear asymptotically. 
The  results  concerning  the  time  path  of  inflation  are  shown  in  figure  4.  First 
concentrate on the lower panel of figure 4. This shows the fraction of agents using the 
extrapolator  heuristics,  i.e.  the  agents  who  do  not  trust  the  inflation  target  of  the 
central bank. One can identify two regimes. There is a regime in which the fraction of 
extrapolators fluctuates around 50% which also implies that the fraction of forecasters 
using the inflation target as their guide (the “inflation targeters”) is around 50%. This 
is sufficient to maintain the rate of inflation within a narrow band of approximately + 
and – 1% around the central bank’s inflation target. There is a second regime though 
which occurs when the extrapolators are dominant. During this regime the rate of 
inflation fluctuates significantly more. Thus the inflation targeting of the central bank 
is fragile. It can be undermined when forecasters decide that relying on past inflation 
movements produces better forecast performances than relying on the central bank’s 
inflation target. This can occur quite unpredictably as a result of stochastic shocks in 
supply and/or demand. We will return to the question of how the central can reduce 
this loss of credibility. 
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The simulations reported in the previous section assumed a given set of numerical 
values of the parameters of the model. It was found that for this set of parameter 
values  animal  spirits  (measured  by  the  movements  in  the  fraction  of  optimistic 
extrapolators) emerge and affect the fluctuations of the output gap. The correlation 
coefficient between the fraction of optimists and the output gap in the simulation 
reported in figure 3 is 0.86. One would like to know how this correlation evolves 
when one changes the parameter values of the model. I concentrate on two parameter 
values here, the intensity of choice parameter, , and the memory agents have when 
calculating  the  performance  of  their  forecasting.  The  latter  is  represented  by  the 
parameter k  in equations (9)-(10) and is a series of declining weights attached to 
past forecast errors. I define  
k
k    ) 1 (     (and  1 0    ). The parameter  can 
then be interpreted as a measure of the memory of agents. When    = 0 there is no   16 
memory; i.e. only last period’s performance matters in evaluating a forecasting rule; 
when   = 1 there is infinite memory, i.e. all past errors, however far in the past, 
obtain the same weight.  
The results of the sensitivity analysis are shown in figure 5. The left hand panel shows 
the correlation between the output gap and the fraction of optimistic extrapolators 
(animal spirits) for increasing values of the intensity of choice parameter, . It can be 
seen  that  when    is  zero  (i.e.  the  switching  mechanism  is  purely  stochastic),  this 
correlation is zero. The interpretation is that in an environment in which agents decide 
purely randomly, i.e. they do not react to the performance of their forecasting rule, 
there are no systematic waves of optimism and pessimism (animal spirits) that can 
influence the business cycle. When  increases, the correlation increases sharply. Thus 
in an environment in which agents learn from their mistakes, animal spirits arise. 
Thus one needs a minimum level of rationality (in the sense of a willingness to learn) 
for animal spirits to emerge and to influence the business cycle. It appears from figure 
3 that this is achieved with relatively low levels of γ.  
The right hand panel shows the correlation between the output gap and the fraction of 
optimists  for  increasing  values  of  the  memory  parameter  .  It  can  be  seen  that  
when  = 1 the correlation is zero. This is the case where agents attach the same 
weight to all past observations, however, far in the past they occur. Put differently, 
when agents have infinite memory; they forget nothing. In that case animal spirits do 
not occur. Thus one needs some forgetfulness (which is a cognitive limitation) to 
produce animal spirits. Note that the degree of forgetfulness does not have to be large. 
For values of  below 0.98 the correlations between output and animal spirits are 
quite high. 
Having presented the main features of the behavioural model I now proceed to show 
how this model leads to a view of macroeconomic dynamics that contrasts greatly 
with the view obtained from the rational expectations DSGE models. I concentrate on 
two areas. The first one has to do with the business cycle theories implicit in the 
behavioural  and  the  rational  expectations  models.  The  second  one  focuses  on  the 
implications for monetary policies.   
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4. Two different business cycle theories 
 
Are  the  behavioural  and  the  New-Keynesian  models  capable  of  mimicking  these 
empirical  regularities?  We  first  focus  on  the  behavioural  model  presented  in  the 
previous section. Figure 3 presented a typical simulation of the output gap obtained in 
this model. The autocorrelation coefficient of the output gap obtained in figure 3 is 
0.95, which is very close to 0.94, i.e. the autocorrelation of the output gap in the US 
during 1960-2009 (see the introduction).  In addition, our behavioural macroeconomic 
model  produces  movements  of  output  that  are  very  different  from  the  normal 
distribution. We show this by presenting the histogram of the output gaps obtained 
from figure 3. The result is presented in figure 6. The frequency distribution of the 
output gap deviates significantly from a normal distribution. There is excess kurtosis 
(kurtosis= 4.4) ,i.e. there is too much concentration of observations around the mean 
for the distribution to be normal. In addition there are fat tails. This means that there 
are  too  many  observations  that  are  extremely  small  or  extremely  large  to  be 
compatible  with  a  normal  distribution.  We  also  applied  a  more  formal  test  of 
normality, the Jarque-Bera test, which rejected normality. Note that the non-normality 
of the distribution of the output gap is produced endogenously by the model, as we 
feed the model with normally distributed shocks.  
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Figure 6: Frequency distribution of simulated output gap 
 
Kurtosis=4.4, Jarque-Bera = 178.4 (p-value = 0.001) 
 
This result is not without implications. It implies that when we use the assumption of 
normality  in  macroeconomic  models  we  underestimate  the  probability  of  large 
changes. In this particular case, assuming normal distributions tends to underestimate 
the probability that intense recessions or booms occur. The same is true in finance 
models that assume normality. These models seriously underestimate the probability 
of  extremely  large  asset  price  changes.  In  other  words  they  underestimate  the 
probability of large bubbles and crashes. To use the metaphor introduced by Nassim 
Taleb,  there  are  many  more  Black  Swans  than  theoretical  models  based  on  the 
normality assumption predict.  
It is fine to observe this phenomenon. It is even better to have an explanation for it. 
Our model provides such an explanation. It is based on the particular dynamics of 
“animal spirits”. We illustrate this in figure 7. This shows the frequency distribution 
of the animal spirits index (defined earlier) which is associated with the frequency 
distribution of the output gap obtained in figure 6. From Figure 7 we observe that 
there is a concentration of the animal spirits at the extreme values of 0 and 1 and also 
in the middle of the distribution (but more spread out). This feature provides the key 
explanation of the non-normality of the movements of the output gap.  
When  the  animal  spirits  index  clusters  in  the  middle  of  the  distribution  we  have 
tranquil  periods.  There  is  no  particular  optimism  or  pessimism,  and  agents  use  a   19 
fundamentalist rule to forecast the output gap. At irregular intervals, however, the 
economy is gripped by either a wave of optimism or of pessimism. The nature of 
these  waves  is  that  beliefs  get  correlated.  Optimism  breeds  optimism;  pessimism 
breeds pessimism. This can lead to situations where everybody has become either 
optimist of pessimist. These periods are characterized by extreme positive of negative 
movements in the output gap (booms and busts).  
From the previous discussion it follows that our behavioural macroeconomic model 
has a strong prediction about how the movements of the output gap are distributed. 
These movements should be non-normal. This is also what one observes in reality.  
 
  Figure 7:Frequency distribution simulated animal spirits 
 
How  well  does  the  New  Keynesian  (DSGE)  model  perform  in  mimicking  the 
empirical regularities about the business cycle. I simulated the Rational Expectations 
version of equations (1) to (3) (the New Keynesian model) using the same calibration. 
I show the movements of the simulated output gap in Figure 8.  The upper panel 
shows the output gap in the time domain and the lower panel in the frequency domain. 
The autocorrelation in the output gap is 0.77, which is significantly lower than in the 
observed data (for the US we found 0.94).  In addition, these output gap movements 
are normally distributed (see lower panel). We could not reject that the distribution is 
normal.    20 




kurtosis: 2.9; Jarque-Bera: 1.03  with p-value=0.5 
 
 
The next step in making this model more empirically relevant has consisted in adding 
autocorrelation in the error terms.  This is now the standard procedure in DSGE-
models (see Smets and Wouters(2003)). We do the same with our version of the New 
Keynesian  model  and  assume  that  the  autocorrelation  of  the  error  terms  in  the 
equations (1) to (3) is equal to 0.9.  The result of this assumption is shown in the 
simulations of the output gap in Figure 9. We now obtain movements of the output 
gap that resemble real-life movements. The autocorrelation of the output gap is now 
0.98, which is very close to the observed number of 0.94 in the postwar US output   21 
gap.  We  still  cannot  reject  normality  though  (see  the  Jarque-Bera  test).  This  is  a 
problem that DSGE-models have not been able to solve.  
 





kurtosis: 3.16; Jarque-Bera: 3.2  with p-value=0.17 
  
 
Thus,  in  order  to  mimic  business  cycle  movements,  the  New  Keynesian  (DSGE) 
model builders have had recourse to introducing autocorrelation in the error terms (the 
shocks  that hit the economy). This  trick has  allowed DSGE-models  to  closely  fit 
observed data (see Smets and Wouters(2003)). This success has been limited to the 
first and second moments of the movements of output, but not to the higher moments   22 
(kurtosis, fat tails).  The latter failure has the implication that in order to explain a 
large movement in output (e.g a deep recession, or a strong boom) DSGE-models 
have to rely on large unpredictable shocks.  
There are two problems with this theory of the business cycle implicit in the DSGE-
models. 
First, business cycles are not the result of an endogenous dynamics. They occur as a 
result of exogenous shocks and slow transmission of these shocks. Put differently, the 
DSGE-models picture a world populated by rational agents who are fully informed. In 
such  a  world  there  would  never  be  business  cycles.  The  latter  arise  because  of 
exogenous disturbances and of constraints on agents’ ability to react instantaneously 
to these shocks.  Thus a given shock will produce ripple effects in the economy, i.e. 
cyclical movements.  
A  second  problem  is  methodological.  When  the  New  Keynesian  model  is  tested 
empirically the researcher finds that there is a lot of the output dynamics that is not 
predicted by the model. This unexplained dynamics is then to be found in the error 
term. So far so good. The next step taken by DSGE-modelers is to conclude that these 
errors (typically autocorrelated) should be considered to be exogenous shocks.  
The problem with this approach is that it is not scientific. When the DSGE-modeler 
finds a dynamics  not  predicted by the model he decides that the New Keynesian 
model must nevertheless be right (because there can be no doubt that  individual 
agents are rational)  and that thus the deviation between the observed dynamics and 




5. The role of output stabilization 
Modern macroeconomics in general, and DSGE-models in particular, have provided 
the intellectual foundation of inflation targeting. Until the eruption of the financial 
crisis  in  2007,  inflation  targeting  strategies  had  become  the  undisputed  policy 
framework modern central banks should adopt. And most did. The official holders of 
macroeconomic wisdom declared that this step towards inflation targeting constituted 
a great victory of macroeconomics as a science (Woodford(2009)). From now on we   23 
would be living in a more stable macroeconomic environment, a “Great Moderation”. 
How things can change so quickly.  
Inflation  targeting,  of  course,  does  not  imply  that  there  is  no  role  for  output 
stabilization. DSGE-modelers who have put a New Keynesian flavor in their models, 
have  always  stressed that  wage and price  rigidities provide a rationale for output 
stabilization by central banks (see Clarida, et al(1999), Gali(2008)). This idea has 
found  its  reflection  in  “flexible”  inflation  targeting  (Svensson(1997), 
Woodford(2002)). Because of the existence of rigidities, a central bank should not 
attempt to keep inflation close to its target all the time. When sufficiently large shocks 
occur  that  lead  to  departures  of  inflation  from  its  target,  the  central  bank  should 
follow a strategy of gradual return of inflation to its target. The rationale is that in a 
world of wage and price rigidities too abrupt attempts to bring back inflation to its 
target would require such high increases in the interest rate as to produce too strong 
declines in output.   
Output stabilization in the DSGE-world, however, is very much circumscribed. The 
need to stabilize arises because of the existence of rigidities in prices that makes it 
necessary to spread out price movements over longer periods. The limited scope for 
output stabilization is based on a model characterized by a stable equilibrium. There is 
no  consideration  of  the  possibility  that  the  equilibrium  may  be  unstable  or  that 
fluctuations in output have a different origin than price rigidities. Should the scope for 
output stabilization be enlarged? In order to shed some light on this issue we derive 
the tradeoff between output and inflation variability in the context of the behavioural 
model, and we formulate some policy conclusions.  
The tradeoffs are constructed as follows. The model was simulated 10,000 times and 
the average output and inflation variabilities were computed for different values of the 
Taylor rule parameters. Figure 10 shows how output variability (panel a) and inflation 
variability (panel b) change as the output coefficient (c2) in the Taylor rule increases 
from 0 to 1. Each line represents the outcome for different values of the inflation 
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Panel a showing the evolution of output variability exhibits the expected result, i.e. as 
the output coefficient (c2) increases (inflation targeting becomes less strict) output 
variability  tends  to  decrease.  One  would  now  expect  that  this  decline  in  output 
variability resulting from more active stabilization comes at the cost of more inflation 
variability. This, however, is not found in panel b. One observes that the relationship 
is non-linear. As the output coefficient is increased from zero, inflation variability 
first declines. Only when the output coefficient increases beyond a certain value (in a   25 
range 0.6-0.8) inflation variability starts increasing. Thus the central bank can reduce 
both output and inflation variability when it moves away from strict inflation targeting 
(c2=0) and engages in some output stabilization. Not too much though. Too much 
output stabilization turns around the relationship and increases inflation variability.  
Figure 10 allows us to construct the tradeoffs between output and inflation variability. 
These are shown in figure 11 for different values of the inflation parameter c1. Take 
the tradeoff AB. This is the one obtained for c1=1. Start from point A on the tradeoff. 
In  point  A,  the  output  parameter  c2=0  (strict  inflation  targeting).  As  output 
stabilization increases we first move downwards. Thus increased output stabilization 
by the central bank reduces output and inflation variability. The relation is non-linear, 
however. At some point, with too high an output stabilization parameter, the tradeoff 
curve starts increasing, becoming a “normal” tradeoff, i.e. a lower output variability is 
obtained at the cost of increased inflation variability.  
Figure 11: Trade-offs in the behavioural model  
 
 
How  can  we  interpret  these  results?  Let  us  start  from  the  case  of  strict  inflation 
targeting, i.e. the authorities set c2=0. There is no attempt at stabilizing output at all. 
The  ensuing  output  variability  intensifies  the  waves  of  optimism  and  pessimism 
(animal spirits) which in turn feed back on output volatility. These larges waves lead 
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to higher inflation variability. Thus, some output stabilization is good; it reduces both 
output and inflation variability by preventing too large swings in animal spirits. With 
no output stabilization at all (c2=0) the forces of animal spirits are so high that the 
high  output  variability  also  increases  inflation  volatility  through  the  effect  of  the 
output gap on inflation (supply equation). Too much output stabilization, however, 
reduces  the  stabilization  bonus  provided  by  a  credible  inflation  target.  When  the 
central  bank  attaches  too  much  importance  to  output  stabilization  it  creates  more 
scope  for  better  forecasting  performance  of  the  inflation  extrapolators,  leading  to 
more inflation variability.   
Figure 11 also tells us something important about inflation targeting. We note that 
increasing the inflation parameter in the Taylor rule (c1) has the effect of shifting the 
tradeoffs downwards, i.e. the central bank can improve the tradeoffs by reacting more 
strongly to changes in inflation
5. The central bank achieves this improvement in the 
tradeoff because by reacting more intensely to changes in inflation it reduces the 
probability that inflation extrapolators will tend to domina te the market, and as a 
result it reduces the probability that inflation targeting looses credibility. Such a loss 
of credibility destabilizes both inflation and output. Thus maintaining credibility of 
inflation  targeting  is  an  important  source  of  macroeco nomic  stability  in  our 
behavioural model.       
 
6. Fiscal policy multipliers: How much do we know? 
Since the eruption of the financial crisis in 2007-08 governments of major countries 
have applied massive policies of fiscal stimulus. This has led to a heated debate about 
the size of the fiscal policy multipliers. This debate has revealed (once more) how 
divergent  economists’  views  are  about  the  size  of  these  multipliers  (see 
Wieland(2010). The estimates of the short-term multipliers vary from 0 to numbers 
far exceeding 1. There has been a lot of soul-searching about the reasons of these 
widely divergent estimates.  
An important source of these differences is to be found in the use of different models 
that embody different priors. For example, in mainstream macroeconomic models that 
                                                 
5 A similar result on the importance of strict inflation is also found in Gaspar, Smets and 
Vestin(2006) who use a macromodel with statistical learning.   
A   27 
incorporate  agents  with  rational  expectations  (both  New  Classical  and  the  New 
Keynesian)  fiscal  policy  multipliers  are  likely  to  be  very  small  as  these  models 
typically have Ricardian equivalence embedded in the model, i.e. agents anticipating 
future tax increases following a fiscal stimulus (budget deficit) will start saving more 
(consuming less) so that one dollar of government spending is offset by 1 dollar of 
less private spending. In these models the fiscal policy multiplier is close to zero. In 
Keynesian models there is scope for a net stimulatory effect of fiscal policies. Thus, 
the  different  estimates  of  fiscal  policy  multipliers  are  not  “neutral  estimates”  but 
reflect  theoretical  priors  and  beliefs  that  have  been  put  in  these  models  in  the 
construction stage.  
Our  behavioral  model  allows  us  to  shed  some  additional  light  on  the  uncertainty 
surrounding the effects of fiscal policies. We will do this by studying how a positive 
shock in aggregate demand produced by a fiscal expansion affects output. We will not 
give  an exhaustive analysis  of  fiscal  policies.  Our model does  not  give sufficient 
detail of government spending and taxation to be able to do this. We model a fiscal 
policy shock just as a shock in the demand equation. What the model allows us to 
establish is the nature of uncertainty surrounding such a shock even in an extremely 
simple model. 
We assume the fiscal policy expansion to occur under two different monetary policy 
regimes. In the first regime we assume that the central bank uses the standard Taylor 
rule as specified in equation (3). Thus under this regime the fiscal policy expansion 
will automatically lead the central bank to raise the interest rate. This follows from the 
fact that the demand stimulus produces an increase in output and inflation to which 
the central bank reacts by raising the interest rate.  
In the second regime we assume that the central bank does not react to the stimulus 
induced expansion of output and inflation by raising the interest rate. We do this, not 
because it is realistic, but rather to estimate the pure Keynesian multiplier effect of a 
fiscal stimulus. The Keynesian multiplier is usually estimated under the assumption of 
a constant interest rate so that crowding out does not occur.  
We show the results of this fiscal policy stimulus under the two monetary policy 
regimes in Figure 12. The upper two panels show the impulse responses under the two 
monetary policy regimes. The instantaneous effects of the fiscal stimulus are the same   28 
under the two regimes. However, under the variable interest rate regime the positive 
effects of the fiscal stimulus decline faster and undershoot in the negative region more 
than under the constant interest regime. This is not surprising as under the variable 
interest  rate  regime  we  see  that  the  interest  rate  is  raised  quite  substantially  (see 
bottom panel), leading to a quick crowding out.  
A second important difference concerns the degree of uncertainty about the size of the 
output effects of a fiscal stimulus. As the upper panels shows the divergence of the 
impulse responses are larger in the constant interest rate regime than in the variable 
interest rate regime. This is also illustrated in the second panels. These show the 
frequency distribution of the short-term output responses under the two regimes. We 
observe a wider spread of these short-term output responses under the fixed interest 
rate  regime.    The  reason  is  to  be  found  in  the  fact  that  animal  spirits  behave 
differently  under  the  two  monetary  regimes.  The  interest  rate  response  under  the 
variable  interest  rate  regime  tends  to  reduce  the  impact  of  animal  spirits  on  the 
transmission  mechanism,  thereby  reducing  the  volatility  in  this  transmission.   Put 
differently, when as a result of the fiscal expansion the central bank raises the interest 
rate, it lowers the expansionary effect of this expansion, making it less likely that 
positive animal spirits will enhance the fiscal policy stimulus.  
These results make clear that there is likely to be a great amount of uncertainty about 
the  size  of  the  output  effects  of  fiscal  policies.  This  uncertainty  is  even  more 
pronounced  in  the  Keynesian  scenario  of  constant  interest  rate.  This  is  also  the 
scenario usually associated with the occurrence of a liquidity trap (a horizontal LM-
curve). This is the assumption that tends to make fiscal policies most effective. In our 
model it is also the assumption making the uncertainty about the size of these effects 
the greatest.  
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Figure 12   






These  differences  are  also  made  clear  from  a  comparison  of  the  long-term  fiscal 
policy multipliers obtained from the same simulations as in Figure 12. The fiscal 
policy shock underlying the previous simulations is a one-period increase in demand 
(by one standard deviation). (The closest example of such a shock is the Cash for 
Clunkers car buying stimulus programs introduced in many European countries and in 
the US in 2009). This temporary increase then produces the impulse responses as 
given in figure 12. In order to obtain the long-term multipliers we add up all the 
output increases (and declines) following this temporary fiscal policy shock. We show   30 
these long-term fiscal policy multipliers in Figure 13 under the two monetary policy 
regimes.  
Two results stand out. First, as expected, the long-term fiscal policy multipliers are 
higher under the constant interest rate rule than under the variable interest rate rule. 
Second, the uncertainty surrounding these long-term multipliers is considerable. And 
this uncertainty is the most pronounced under the constant interest rate rule.  
It should be stressed again that the nature of the uncertainty here is not the uncertainty 
surrounding the parameters of the model. We assume exactly the same parameters in 
all these simulations. Put differently, it is not the uncertainty produced by the use of 
different models with different prior beliefs about the effectiveness of fiscal policies 
that produce uncertainty. The uncertainty is due to differences in initial conditions 
(market sentiments). These differences in market sentiments have a pronounced effect 
on how the same fiscal policy shock is transmitted in the economy. 
 
Figure 13: Long-term fiscal policy multipliers: Frequency distribution 
 





Capitalism  is  characterized  by  booms  and  busts,  i.e.  economic  activity  is  often 
subjected to strong growth followed by sharp declines. As a result, the frequency 
distribution  of  output  gap  (and  output  growth)  is  non-normal,  exhibiting  excess 
kurtosis and fat tails.  The latter means that if we are basing our forecasts on the 
normal distribution we tend to underestimate the probability that in any one period a 
large increase or decrease in the output gap can occur.    31 
In this paper we used two alternative models to explain this empirical regularity. One 
model  is  the  DSGE-model,  which  assumes  rational  expectations.  The  other  is  a 
behavioral model. This is a model in which agents experience  cognitive limitations. 
These limitations force agents to use simple rules to forecast output and inflation. 
Rationality  is  introduced  into  this  model  by  assuming  a  learning  mechanism  that 
allows for the selection of those rules that are more profitable than others.  
In the DSGE-model, large booms and busts can only be explained by large exogenous 
shocks. Price and wage rigidities then lead to wavelike movements of output and 
inflation. Thus booms and busts are explained exogenously. The fat tails observed in 
the  frequency  distribution  of  the  output  gap  arise  because  there  are  large  shocks 
hitting the economy.  
Our  behavioral  model  provides  for  a  very  different  explanation.  The  behavioural 
model creates correlations in beliefs, which in turn generate waves of optimism and 
pessimism. The latter produce endogenous cycles, which are akin to the Keynesian 
animal  spirits.  Occasionally  this  correlation  of  beliefs  leads  to  extreme  optimism 
(explaining  booms)  followed  by  extreme  pessimism  (explaining  busts).  Thus  the 
behavioral  model  provides  for  an  endogenous  explanation  of  business  cycle 
movements. 
In both models, the inflation targeting regime turns out to be of great importance to 
stabilize  the  economy.  In  the  behavioural  model  this  follows  from  the  fact  that 
credible inflation targeting also helps to reduce correlations in beliefs and the ensuing 
self-fulfilling  waves  of  optimism  and  pessimism.  However,  and  this  is  where  the 
behavioural  model  departs  from  the  rational  expectations  model,  strict  inflation 
targeting is not an optimal policy. Some output stabilization (given a credible inflation 
target) also helps in reducing the correlation of biased beliefs thereby reducing the 
scope for waves of optimism and pessimism to emerge and to destabilize output and 
inflation.  
The behavioural model proposed in this paper can be criticised for being “ad-hoc”. 
There is no doubt that the model has ad-hoc features, i.e. assumptions that cannot be 
grounded on some deeper principle, and therefore have to be taken for granted. In 
defence of this “ad-hocquerie”, the following should be stressed. Once we leave the 
comfortable world of agents who experience no limits to their cognitive abilities, ad-  32 
hoc  assumptions  are  inevitable.  This  is  due  to  the  fact  that  we  do  not  fully 
comprehend the way individuals with cognitive limitations process information. In 
contrast, there is no secret in how the superbly informed individuals in the rational 
expectations world process information. They understand the model, and therefore 
there is only one way to write down how they form their expectations. This feature 
may give the model builder intellectual satisfaction, but it is unclear whether such a 
model  is  useful  to  understand  a  world  in  which  agents’  cognitive  capacities  are 
severely restricted.   
An important shortcoming of the behavioural model presented in this paper is that is 
does not introduce financial markets and the banking sector. Financial markets have 
been  shown  to  be  gripped  by  movements  of  optimism  and  pessimism  leading  to 
bubbles and crashes. It will be interesting to extend the model to incorporate these 
features and to see how they interact with the animal spirits analyzed in this paper.  
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